Estimation and simulation of sustainable real exchange rates in some of the new EU accession countries point to potential difficulties in sustaining the ERM2 regime if entered too soon and with weak policies. According to the estimates, the Czech, Hungarian, and Polish currencies were overvalued in 2003. Simulations, conditional on large-model macroeconomic projections, suggest that under current policies those currencies would be unlikely to stay within the ERM2 stability corridor during 2004-2010. In-sample simulations for Greece, Portugal, and Spain indicate both a much smaller misalignment of national currencies prior to ERM2, and a more stable path of real exchange rates over the medium term than can be expected for the new accession countries. #
Introduction
The public debate about the adoption of the euro in the new EU accession countries has been framed by three views. First, the euro skeptics argue for opting out. However, all the new accession countries have accepted the obligation of eventual euro adoption. Second, the euro optimists argue that the two-year exchange rate mechanism (ERM2) and the www.elsevier.com/locate/ecosys Economic Systems 29 (2005) currencies would be unlikely to stay within the ERM2 stability corridors during [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . These results suggest that an early ''race to the euro'' is likely to do more harm than good, unless macroeconomic policies are strengthened.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized facts on EU accession countries. Section 3 outlines a macroeconomic model of real exchange rate and capital stock determination. Section 4 shows our empirical results for the secondgeneration SRER model. Section 5 suggests some policy implications of our findings, and the final section concludes.
Forerunners and latecomers: are there lessons to be learned?
Historically, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) countries, the forerunners, have been put to several tests before being allowed to adopt the euro and similar hurdles will have to be overcome by the latecomer countries that joined the EMU in May 2004 (the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia). How challenging is it going to be to meet those conditions for the latecomers? On the one hand, a possible conflict between trend appreciation of real exchange rates and the EMU criteria of low inflation and a stable nominal exchange rate is seen in the Central European transition countries. On the other hand, there are other issues at stake than the technical criteria of EMU membership: if a currency were to be irrevocably fixed at an improper parity to the euro, the misalignment would have to be adjusted through other, more costly processes, such as domestic price or wage adjustment.
Hence, the question can be simplified as follows: is the volatile process of real exchange rate appreciation in the transition countries over, or is it likely to continue for a few more years, resulting in potentially costly adjustment in those countries?
Exchange rate developments in the transition countries
Our analysis is motivated by a few stylized facts regarding the transition countries that joined the EU in May 2004 and which we will call the ''latecomers.'' We focus on the four accession countries with flexible exchange rate regimes -the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia -for which consistent data and country models are available from the NIGEM. 1 First, their currencies have appreciated substantially in real terms during the last decade ( Fig. 1) . On average, between 1992 and 2003, the real exchange rates in the new accession countries appreciated by 3.3% annually, one-half of which was realized in 1998-2002 and was partly attributable to excessive devaluation at the start of the transition process (Halpern and Wyplosz, 1997) . Second, most empirical papers agree that rising total factor productivity in the tradable-good sector (the Balassa-Samuelson effect) does not explain fully the gradual and long-lasting real exchange rate appreciation in transition countries. 2 Third, the observed appreciation cannot be explained away by the traditional argument of external wealth accumulation (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2002) . According to that hypothesis, countries with sizable external liabilities need to run large trade balance surpluses to service those liabilities and, consequently, positive net exports require a ''competitive,'' depreciated real exchange rate. Contrary to the theory, transition economies, with the exception of Slovenia, have piled up external liabilities -their net foreign assets are negative and increasing -and, at the same time, have run persistent trade deficits accompanied by real exchange rate appreciation.
Fourth, most transition countries have received massive inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) that may have affected investors' perceptions about the countries' longterm sustainable external balances. Assuming that export growth and productivity improvements are driven by FDI -as compared to competitiveness of national exchange rates -contemporaneous capital inflows may signal expected future net export gains consistent with appreciated real exchange rates. Foreign direct investment is the main culprit in explaining the real exchange rate appreciation, which is otherwise at odds with the observed Balassa-Samuelson and external-wealth accumulation effects. This hypothesis is consistent with previous empirical work related to foreign direct investment in transition countries (Lansbury et al., 1996; Benáček et al., 2003) .
Those countries that joined the EU in the 1980s -Greece in 1981 and Portugal and Spain in 1986 -and which we will call the forerunners, had had a turbulent past as well. They missed out on early EU entry because their then political regimes made them incompatible with joining and their road to the euro was quite long-20 and 13 years, respectively. Prior to adopting the euro, the forerunners appeared to fit a similar pattern of stylized facts as the new accession countries. The forerunners' real exchange rates appreciated on average by 0.5% annually during the ten years prior to joining the EMU, their net external liabilities increased, partly reflecting FDI inflows, and current account deficits widened.
The concept of sustainable exchange rates and accession countries
The concept of a sustainable real exchange rate, which goes back to the research of Artus (1977) , can be used for accession-country exchange rate assessment in two ways. First, as a measure of misalignment of historic real exchange rate series. Second, as a forward-looking measure of real exchange rate stability in the run-up to euro adoption. The empirical results of real exchange rate misalignment are mixed and often contradictory, depending to a large extent on the method chosen, the two main approaches being singleequation, time-series based estimates and normative-target based models.
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Authors employing the single-equation, cointegration approach assume that the real exchange rate's return to its equilibrium value is directly observable. This might be a A. Bulíř, K. Šmídková / Economic Systems 29 (2005) 163-186 167 reasonable assumption for 30-year-long series of industrial-country exchange rates, but it is less so for short, transition-country series that have moved in one direction only. In contrast, normative-target based estimates originating in the work of Williamson (1994) allow for a disequilibrium that is both unobservable from the actual data and long-lasting-real exchange rate developments can be driven by a notional current account or external debt targets. Empirical papers, especially those based on the time-series, single-equation approach, have been inconclusive with respect to the direction of currency misalignment. While currencies were found to be overvalued using one set of variables, they were often found balanced or undervalued in another. The puzzling ambiguity was explained by Driver and Westaway (2005) , who found that alternative methods of computing equilibrium real exchange rates work with different time horizons and hence most of the differences can be explained away by the horizons of the individual studies. Long-term studies have found transition country currencies typically undervalued, whereas medium-term studies have found them mostly overvalued. By choosing different measures of external equilibrium or different speeds of disequilibrium adjustment, the resulting estimates of real equilibrium rates can change easily. We thus remain doubtful about the policy relevance of results based on the single-equation approach.
Normative-target based estimates are much less dependent on the horizon of the study, even though they remain sensitive to the choice of target variables. At least, and in contrast to the cointegration approach, the sensitivity of exchange rates to the choice of the target variable can be explicitly measured. For example, Spatafora and Stavrev (2003) estimated a model with a current account target, finding that, based on alternative assumptions of the international oil price and trade elasticities, the Russian ruble is either valued fairly or undervalued by up to 40%. Coudert and Couharde (2002) The empirical literature to date has focused much less on the issue of real exchange rate stability in the run-up to euro adoption. É gert (2002) concluded that accession countries should enter the ERM as quickly as possible. Š mídková et al. (2002) were much less optimistic, foreseeing significant volatility unrelated to the underlying fundamentals. We will explore this issue in the empirical section as well.
A model of FDI-driven real exchange rates
In the remainder of the paper, we will focus on the role of foreign direct investment and external debt in explaining real exchange rate developments in the new accession countries. 4 To motivate the empirical estimates, we begin by outlining a simple dynamic model of a small, open economy, the real exchange rate developments of which are affected by foreign direct investment (see Appendix A for the algebraic solution of the model). FDI has exercised a powerful effect on transition economies, both by stimulating aggregate supply and by raising permanent income. The two main channels of the impact of FDI on growth are well researched: first, through an increase in total investment and, second, through interaction of the FDI's more advanced technology with the host's human capital (Lim, 2001) . To the extent the latter channel affects sectoral productivity it is akin to the Balassa-Samuelson effect. The literature, however, has offered limited agreement on the quantitative importance of those effects. In our model -which resembles that of Blanchard (1981) -FDI is equally productive as domestic capital, contributing to capital accumulation. The impact of FDI can be modeled through standard money-and goods-equilibrium schedules, a classical production function, and uncovered interest parity. Output is increasing in the stock of foreign direct investment, above and beyond the increase in the capital stock, primarily because FDI generates substantial productivity spillovers outside of its sectoral allocation. The IS curve can be thought of as a demand schedule, while on the supply side physical output is governed by a classical production function. Capital accumulation is assumed to be decreasing in the existing stock of capital, the real interest rate, and, owing to crowding out, in total debt.
Latecomer countries that have suboptimal capital stock accumulate capital faster than advanced countries with an optimal capital stock. Once the capital stock approaches its optimal level, the accumulation process slows down. Total debt is constrained in a debt accumulation schedule, where total debt is accumulated by FDI inflows and fiscal deficits, decreases with domestic growth, and is predetermined by its initial level. In other words, we assume that foreign investors care about the transition country's growth prospects, return on FDI, and overall prospects of servicing its obligations (Campos and Kinoshita, 2003; Bevan and Estrin, 2004) . It is reasonable to assume that the other commonly used determinants of FDI inflows (lower wages, market attractiveness, ''cultural distance,'' and so on) are met in the countries in question. The model is closed with uncovered interest parity.
The solution to this model is a ''saddle point'' and the equilibrium point is at the intersection of the two stationary lines, in the capital-exchange rate space, with the only convergent path along the dashed line (Fig. 2) .
Dynamics around the steady-state
We consider a few plausible shocks and their impact on the capital stock and real exchange rate. First, an unexpected permanent increase in foreign direct investment will affect both the real exchange rate and the capital stock, as their stationary lines move south, to c 0 = 0 and k 0 = 0, respectively (Fig. 3) . As a result, at equilibrium, the domestic currency appreciates. The real exchange rate appreciation will be instantaneous, with some overshooting, and the capital stock will decline marginally owing to the FDI shock. Hence, the first round output and net-export effect is negative, depending on the size of the real exchange rate and FDI parameters in the IS schedule. The stock of capital will continue increasing, however, and the larger capital stock will boost output, partly offsetting the real appreciation. These features seem to be consistent with the growth pattern of Central European transition countries.
A number of alternative scenarios can be laid out, such as an increase in initial debt or a permanent increase in foreign demand. First, an increase in the initial level of total debt will affect only the real exchange rate schedule through a drain on the external current account, gradually appreciating the currency and lowering the equilibrium capital stock through FDI outflow. Steady-state output declines both because larger debt crowds out future investment and the domestic currency appreciates, following the higher interest rates. Second, an unexpected increase in foreign demand has a symmetric impact on the real exchange rate and capital stock schedules through the LM schedule. As a result, both schedules shift down by an equal amount, leaving the steady-state capital stock unchanged and the domestic currency appreciated. Whereas foreign demand raised output, the worsening competitiveness offsets it by the exact same amount.
The model above offers a sensible if necessarily simplified description of the various channels through which FDI affects the economy. First, we note the additional growth effect from FDI inflows. Second, we observe that the FDI-real exchange rate nexus can dominate the net-foreign-asset nexus of exchange rate determination. Third, the associated real appreciation may offset some of the integration gain. Fourth, the model shows that FDI-dependent economies are vulnerable to changes in their indebtedness.
Empirical evidence
We limit the normative-target estimates of sustainable real exchange rates to three forerunners: Greece, Portugal, and Spain, and four latecomers with de jure floating exchange rates: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. After outlining the empirical model, we rationalize our choice of calibrated parameters and present the results. The selected approach defines the external balance in terms of stocks rather than flows and emphasizes the role of foreign direct investment as the decisive factor in fundamentalbased real exchange rate appreciation. The data are drawn from the NIESR and IMF databases.
The SRER model

The empirical model
The theoretical model outlined in Section 3 could be calibrated and simulated, and we would compare the trajectories of debt, trade, and other variables under flexible and fixed exchange rates. However, we see large benefits of simplifying the framework by treating FDI, trade developments, and growth as exogenous vis-à-vis the model. Rather than exploring the different equilibrating mechanisms under floats and pegs, which are well known, we test how the equilibrium exchange rate would change if only the exchange rate regime changed. Is it true, as the pragmatists have argued, that the switch from float to peg should not matter? If it did matter, how serious could the resulting real exchange rate misalignment be?
Hence, we take all future macroeconomic variables, such as demand and trade variables, from the NIGEM database as projected under the assumption of flexible exchange rates and focus on a single hypothetical question: how would the trajectory of the real equilibrium exchange rate change if the nominal exchange rate were to be fixed on January 1, 2004? As explained below, we allow changes to the external debt path and trade flows, but no feedback from real overvaluation to FDI, trade developments, or growth can take place. Moreover, we allow the misalignment vis-à-vis the equilibrium rate to be long-lasting.
The normative-target, SRER framework has been built around econometric trade equations relating exports and imports to fundamental variables such as the real exchange rate, the terms of trade, external debt, and domestic and foreign economic activity. The SRER model differs from its predecessors in several aspects. First, the FDI-driven integration gains are incorporated directly into the model in a manner similar to É gert and Lommatzsch (2003) . Second, the current account balance is not restricted, as it is asset and liability stocks, not flows that define the external equilibrium. The sustainable level of external debt is defined according to openness to trade. Third, all variables exogenous to the SRER are modeled within an underlying model framework (NIGEM), ensuring consistency and interdependency. Exports increase with the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) to approximate the integration gain.
5 Exports also expand with foreign demand and improvement in the relative price of domestic goods either through real depreciation or a term of trade change (the real exchange rate being defined in terms of the relative import price):
where X denotes an export index, E the US dollar nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the domestic currency, P m and P x stand for the effective price of imports and exports, respectively, P is the domestic consumer price level, Y * denotes foreign demand, and F measures the FDI-to-GDP ratio. Parameters a 1 À a 3 have expected non-negative values.
Demand for imports is driven by domestic activity, the real exchange rate, and the FDI stock:
where M denotes an import index and Y is domestic output. Parameters b 1 and b 2 À b 3 have negative and positive expected values, respectively. Moreover, for the integration gain a 3 > b 3 must hold, that is, FDI improves net exports. The trade balance, external borrowing, and net external debt interest payments determine the level of net external debt in any given period. External debt, however, is not an unbounded variable-for a given rate of growth and initial real exchange rate a unique path of sustainable external debt is predetermined. At the same time, accession countries try to exploit fully the maneuvering space of sustainable debt, as FDI inflows bring about the integration gain. In the SRER framework, the path of sustainable debt can be approximated by considering the initial stock of debt and the country-specific sustainable debt target for the end of the simulation period.
To the extent that it is not possible to determine the debt target within the underlying model, we base the targets on selected measures of external sustainability:
where D * denotes the sustainable path of net external debt (in the domestic currency, ratio to GDP), and D 0 and D T are the initial and target levels of net external debt.
A solution for sustainable real exchange rates reflecting the above economic fundamentals can be found simultaneously using equations (1-3):
where C * is the sustainable real exchange rate,M andX the volumes of real imports and exports, respectively, in the base year, respectively, and r is the world real interest rate.
Parameter calibration
The parameters used in equation (4) Table 1) . We note that, first, the integration gain (a 3 > b 3 ) is significant: a 1% point increase in FDI increases net exports by almost 0.5%. Second, the FDI elasticities of exports and imports are somewhat higher than the estimates for Ireland, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Sweden, and the Netherlands (Pain and Wakelin, 1998) . Third, the exchange rate elasticity of exports is higher for the latecomer economies than for developed economies alone, reflecting underlying structural and institutional differences between those two groups of countries.
We incorporate a trade-based, country-specific definition of net external debt target, values of which are binding in 2022 (Table 2) , whereas the earlier models assumed a fixed target equal to 60% of GDP (Ades and Kaune, 1997) . Recent events have shown that the rule-of-thumb approach may not be flexible enough, sustainable external debt ought to be related to countries' ability to service it (International Monetary Fund, 2002) , and uncertainty related to the target can be large. Nevertheless, the impact of changes in the sustainable debt-to-GDP ratio on the SRER estimates is relatively small: a 10% point change in the ratio generated a change in the equilibrium real exchange rate of 0.04-0.4% only.
Data issues
Data consistency is crucial for the SRER calculations, given the endogenous relationship between various variables, such as domestic and foreign demand or trade and financial flows. We rely on the global econometric model (NIGEM) maintained by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, which allows us to project domestic and external variables within the same model (Table 3) . Our model experiment is based on an unconditional forecast-we implicitly assume that the NIGEM projection represents the optimal trajectory of macroeconomic developments. 
Simulation techniques and result uncertainty
We solved equations (1-4) in the WinSolve 3.0 (2003) simulation package, using the Newton procedure. Most data are derived from the NIGEM database, while some historical series were supplanted with IFS data. For off-sample simulations NIGEM projections were also used. Hence, the only variable simulated in equation (4) is the sustainable real exchange rate. All other projected variables are treated as exogenous vis-à-vis our model. For each country, baseline SRERs are calculated by solving equation (4) As with all simulations, the SRER estimates are useful only to the extent that we can be confident about their significance. Economists are generally faced with two basic uncertainties. While parameter uncertainty is reflected in the width of the confidence interval, the more serious of the two, model uncertainty, is best addressed by applying the model to different countries and/or periods. We performed both extensive sensitivity tests and comparisons with other papers assessing the real exchange rates of accession countries.
(The results of the sensitivity tests are available from the authors upon request.) Regarding the former, confidence intervals are calculated for both the in-sample and off-sample (projection) periods. While the in-sample confidence intervals are simulated using the estimation errors of the trade equations, the off-sample confidence intervals are based on the historical standard errors of the exogenous variables and the uncertainty about the target value of the external debt (D * ). As far as the precision of our estimates is concerned, we found confidence bands of a similar order as compared to other studies on fundamental real exchange rates. 6 Regarding model uncertainty, we compared our results with recent medium-term studies surveyed in É gert and Lommatzsch (2003) and found that our estimates of misalignment were of similar sign and magnitude. We acknowledge, however, that the current literature offers no definitive way of determining the true model of equilibrium real exchange rates.
Forerunners: test-driving the model
Before applying our framework to the new accession countries, we tested the model on the sample of the three forerunners: Greece, Portugal, and Spain. The Portuguese escudo and Spanish peseta re-entered the ERM in 1996, whereas the Greek drachma joined in 1998. Following a two-year period of nominal-convergence assessment, these countries adopted the euro in 1999 and 2001, respectively. We ask the following question: did the change in exchange rate regime affect external equilibrium and cause misalignment? To answer this question, we simulate equation (4) using the relevant data, obtaining an estimate of the real equilibrium exchange rate as well as estimates of the confidence intervals (the SRER corridor).
We find that, first, all forerunners started their ERM membership with fundamentally correct parities vis-à-vis the euro and, second, prior to euro adoption, after two years in the ERM, their parities appeared sustainable (Fig. 4) . Regarding the former, the peseta was slightly undervalued and the drachma and escudo were within their SRER corridors. Regarding the latter, the drachma remained broadly in line with the equilibrium rate predicted by the model, 7 whereas the euro was some 10-20% too strong in real terms for Portugal and Spain. In summary, the model indicates that the forerunners entered both the exchange rate mechanism and the eurozone at the right time and with the right parity. Post-adoption real appreciation vis-à-vis the SRER, however, seemed to be relatively persistent, with no signs of abating. These findings seem broadly consistent with the recent trade and especially debt developments in the forerunner countries (see, for example, International Monetary  Fund, 2004) .
What does the forerunners' ''smooth sailing'' in the run-up to euro adoption imply for the latecomers' entry into the eurozone? The results will depend on two conditions. First, on the initial real exchange rate misalignment and, second, on the volatility of the latecomers' macroeconomic forecasts vis-à-vis the actual developments in the forerunner group. On the one hand, the forerunners' historic real exchange rate volatility was only 0.1%, as against 3.3% in the latecomer countries, mostly as a result of tightly managed nominal exchange rates in the run-up to euro adoption. On the other hand, the average export-to-GDP ratio in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia is almost 60%, as compared to less than 30% in Greece, Portugal, and Spain, presumably lowering the exchange rate volatility. Moreover, Portugal and Spain entered the ERM during a period of relative tranquility on international financial markets.
We also noticed some post-ERM developments in the forerunner countries that would have interesting implications for the latecomers. First, the stock of net FDI declined following the adoption of the euro, in part owing to a slowdown in FDI inflows (Fig. 1) . Should an FDI slowdown occur in the latecomer countries, it would generate two processes. On the one hand, it would depreciate the equilibrium exchange rate. On the other hand, it would limit the expected integration gain, restricting real convergence. Second, the adoption of the euro accelerated the forerunners' accumulation of foreign liabilities, which was possible because the stock of debt was initially low and certainly lower than in the latecomer countries at present.
Computational results for sustainable real exchange rates in accession countries
In this section, we will provide two sets of empirical results for the Czech koruna, Hungarian forint, Polish zloty, and Slovenian tolar. First, a measure of the misalignment of real exchange rates. Second, a forward-looking measure of real exchange rate stability in the run-up to euro adoption, conditional on NIGEM macroeconomic forecasts. The results of these tests -conditional on NIGEM macroeconomic projections -are not commensurate with an early ERM2 entry.
Misalignment
We find that three out of the four accession currencies were significantly above their fundamental-based equilibrium exchange rates in 2003 (Fig. 5) . Fixing the euro conversion rates at the end-2003 exchange rates and without major policy adjustments to reverse the slide in fundamentals would have posed a major problem for the forint, zloty, and koruna (in that order), but not for the tolar. Even if we disregard the numerical values of the estimated misalignment -our estimates have fairly wide confidence intervals and depend on post-2004 projections of macroeconomic variables -the recent developments signal a significant break with the past. On average, the fundamentals explained about 60% of the real appreciation during the last decade. We can only conjecture what might explain the rest. Some obvious culprits include changes in the export-import nexus, excessively optimistic expectations about the speed of real and nominal convergence, a temporary impact of privatization inflows, and the psychological effect of EU enlargement. And part of the misalignment is possibly due to medium-term volatility of nominal exchange rates.
In our model the koruna, forint, and zloty were found to be overvalued, while the tolar appears to be in line with fundamentals. The Czech koruna, from a minor undervaluation during 1995-1997, mostly owing to a low debt, appreciated sharply in 1999 to 5% above its fundamental-based value and the overvaluation increased to about 15% at end-2003. The movement is explained by accumulation of external liabilities, although part of the misalignment was corrected through nominal depreciation. The Hungarian forint, which was more volatile than the other currencies in our sample, remained close to its equilibrium value until end-2000: although net foreign assets were improving, FDI declined. Starting in 2001, the forint appreciated to 40% above its fundamental value. The Polish zloty was close to its fundamental value until early 2000, but the estimated misalignment reached some 15-25% in 2002 as the accumulation of external liabilities increased. The Slovenian tolar, after a protracted period of minor real undervaluation, seemed to be in line with its fundamentals at the end of 2003.
Sustainability
We find that in our model the nominal convergence required by the Maastricht criteria and ERM2 may prevent the forint, koruna, and zloty -at their end-2003 levels -from converging toward their equilibrium real exchange rates. In other words, fixing those currencies and assuming six more years of current macroeconomic policies -as projected by the NIGEM -would still not guarantee the achievement of fundamental equilibrium. Thus, floating-regime policies would not be good enough for a fixed-regime environment of the ERM2 and we can reject the euro optimists' claim of costless move from one regime to another. 8 In other words, the current fast export growth is not fast enough to keep external debt at sustainable levels. Formally, we compare the estimated SRER confidence bands with the so-called ''stability corridors'' that are to reflect the convergence criteria both for inflation and exchange rate stability (Fig. 6 ).
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For the period 2004-2010 we find the SRERs appreciating in all four countries, but the koruna and forint appear to be the farthest away from the implied ERM2 corridor and, hence, at odds with the ERM2 entry date toward the end of the decade.
10 As a result of their end-2003 misalignment, both currencies remain well outside the narrow 3.75% stability corridor throughout 2010. Only in the late 2000s would the mid-point of the estimated koruna SRER approach the wider, 16.5% stability corridor. The mid-point of the forint SRER would be some 30% above the upper band of the wider corridor. The results for the tolar suggest the opposite scenario-it would need a modest revaluation toward the end of the decade. The zloty is the only currency where our calculations suggest end-period convergence of the SRER and stability corridors, that is, ERM2 entry seems consistent with the pre-announced date. In summary, our model findings suggest that if those four countries were to enter the ERM2 in 2004 and try to meet the Maastricht criteria under the existing, floating-regime Fig. 6 . Latecomers: how sustainable are current real exchange rates? Lower values imply real appreciation. The narrow and wide bands are defined as 3.75% and 16.5% around the central estimate, respectively, to reflect both the inflation (1.5%) and exchange rate (2.25%) convergence criteria. The band is narrowed to 1.5% thereafter, as the national exchange rates are fixed and only the inflation criterion matters. Source: Authors' calculations. macroeconomic policies, it might do them more harm than good. At present, all currencies but the tolar seem to be overvalued and are likely to remain so for a considerable time.
Policy implications
According to our model, early adoption of the euro by the latecomer countries is unlikely to be as smooth as that by the forerunner countries given current macroeconomic policies. At end-2003, just before EU enlargement, real exchange rates were not close to their fundamental-based values and an early fixing vis-à-vis the euro would have resulted in overvalued currencies in all countries but Slovenia. From a medium-term perspective, meeting the convergence tests for exchange rate and price stability would be costly, owing to the only gradual convergence of equilibrium real exchange rates toward the narrow band.
What would need to be done to achieve convergence in our model? Either the new accession countries' growth and export performance would have to improve substantially compared to our model or their macroeconomic policies -fiscal deficits and external borrowing -would have to be tightened compared to the NIGEM projections under flexible exchange rates. In other words, what we paraphrased as the pragmatist approach -wait for the right time and do what you can -may not be a viable option. While this approach served some countries well in the past -most notably Greece -it may not work for the new EU accession countries, given the simulated slow adjustment of their exchange rates to fundamental equilibrium and large initial disequilibria. Moreover, increased uncertainty may be a problem: finding the ''right'' time and the ''right'' exchange rate is likely to be more difficult than in the past.
Our results also suggest that following the adoption of the euro, the convergence problems would not disappear. For example, should a slowdown of FDI inflows -similar to that in the forerunner countries -materialize, the latecomers' real convergence might decelerate substantially. Moreover, it is unclear whether the new EU accession countries would be able to accumulate foreign liabilities in a fashion comparable to the forerunners, given their already high levels of external debt. Tighter fiscal policies would be needed to put a lid on external financing requirements (Schadler et al., 2004) .
Conclusions
The paper develops a theoretical model of sustainable real exchange rates with strong neoclassical effects, and simplifies and simulates it on a sample of three ''forerunners'' and four new accession countries using time series from the NIGEM database. The model is tailored to the conditions of the new accession countries and provides an alternative to the existing models. The observed real exchange rates are then compared with simulated real equilibrium exchange rates based on the assumption that the nominal rates to the euro were fixed at a certain point in time. Unlike in most other models, the resulting misalignment can be long-lasting, as we do not impose mean reversion.
The simulations of the sustainable real exchange rates in four of the new accession countries suggest that three of them (the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) would likely experience difficulties during their stay in the ERM2 mechanism if they joined too early and with wrong policies. According to our results, all currencies but the Slovenian tolar were overvalued in 2003. Simulating the performance of SRERs through to 2010, we find that the currencies fixed at their end-2004 exchange rates would likely not stay within their stability corridors, conditional on the NIGEM projections. The primary impact of external disequilibrium in this model is accumulation of debt.
Pursuing the convergence criteria too soon may harm the sustainable external position of the Czech, Hungarian, and Polish economies, while the Slovenian currency may require revaluation prior to euro adoption. In contrast, ex post simulations for those countries, which accepted the euro in the late 1990s -Greece, Portugal, and Spain -show no real exchange rate misalignment of their national currencies at that time. Moreover, their real exchange rates followed a more stable, medium-term path than can be expected in the new accession countries. An early ''race to the euro'' may be a costly competition indeed.
